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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LABOR LAW-THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPULSORY UNION
MEMBERSHIP OF BROADCAST COMMENTATORS. Buckley v. Ameri-
can Federation of Television and Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d
Cir. 1974).
In the recent case of Buckley v. American Federation of Televi-
sion and Radio Artists,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that it is not an infringement of first amendment
rights to require television and radio commentators to pay compulsory
union dues when some benefit is derived from such payment. In the
same case the court passed on to the NLRB the task of deciding
whether coerced "full-fledged" union membership and adherence to
union discipline under closed shop agreements are unfair labor prac-
tices when applied to conservative political commentators.
The dispute that gave rise to the instant case concerned two
nationally known conservative spokesmen, William F. Buckley and M.
Stanton Evans. Both men present political, social and economic
commentary over television and radio. Neither has been noted for his
support of the labor union movement.
The defendant, American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists (AFTRA) is an unincorporated association organized under the
laws of the state of New York and affiliated with the AFL-CIO. It
is a labor union and collective bargaining agent for artists involved in
the field of radio and television. AFTRA is a "labor organization" as
defined by the National Labor Relations Act.'
Buckley's employer/broadcaster was RKO General, Inc., and
Evans' was the Columbia Broadcasting System. These corporations
contracted with the plaintiffs in the state of New York. AFTRA had
union shop 3 agreements with both employers. Under the agreements
all radio and television artists employed by these broadcasters in the
state of New York were required to join the union, pay membership
dues, and submit to union discipline from the thirtieth day following
1. Buckley v. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305
(2d Cir. 1974).
2. "[A]ny organization . . . in which employees participate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances
." National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1973).
3. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1973).
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the beginning of their employment as a condition of their continued
employment.
The federal statute which specifically authorizes union shops also
allows the several states to prohibit such compulsory unionism. These
state statutes, known as "right to work laws," are presently in effect
in approximately twenty states. New York, where the union agree-
ment with the broadcasters was made, had no such right to work legisla-
tion. Therefore, both conservative commentators were required to join
the union in order to continue to broadcast their views.
The plaintiffs asserted that since the union shop agreements were
permitted by federal legislation, the coerced union membership and
payment of dues constituted state action and, as such, were prohibited
by the first amendment.4  The union's Code of Fair Practice forbade
the members from any act or conduct which was prejudicial to the
union and gave the union the right to order its members to cease work-
ing for any employer the union wished to boycott. Plaintiffs claimed
that such coerced submission to union discipline, enforced by the threat
of possible termination of employment, had a chilling effect on their
first amendment rights and constituted an unreasonable prior restraint"
on their rights of free speech.
The district court held that this union authority, since it was
achieved through an act of Congress, was an unconstitutional violation
of first amendment rights if applied to plaintiffs.'
The Second Circuit did not agree. It found that the district court
had lacked jurisdiction of much of the case and had ruled incorrectly
on the rest. The court remanded to the NLRB the issues of compul-
sory membership and discipline. These, the court said, amounted to
an arguably unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations
Act," and so must be deferred to the exclusive competence of the
NLRB.9 The Second Circuit felt that a federal court could play only
a limited role until such time as a grievance was presented to the NLRB
and review was properly taken to the courts.
4. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
5. At trial plaintiff Evans testified, "I have felt a chilling effect on my right to
express myself in light of the fact that the union exercises over me certain disciplinary
powers which could result in fining me or taking me off the air, if I acted in such a
way as to prejudice that union." Evans v. American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The trial court found that "Such
chilling effect does exist here." Id. at 838.
6. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
7. 354 F. Supp. at 845-947.
8. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1973).
9. 496 F.2d at 312.
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Although the court refused to decide whether compulsory mem-
bership and submission to discipline is constitutional, the court strongly
hinted its views. It noted the arguable unfairness of such compulsion
and it flatly stated that the plaintiffs' rights to continue media employ-
ment would not be endangered should they seek to crystallize their con-
troversy with the union by resigning from full-fledged union member-
ship. 10 The court assured the plaintiffs that, as long as they paid their
dues upon resigning from the union, they should be able to obtain a
federal district court injunction against termination of employment
pending the outcome of that litigation. The court added that there
would be an excellent chance that Buckley and Evans would succeed
on the merits of a claim that payment of dues is sufficient compliance
with the union shop agreements.'
The Second Circuit's refusal to rule on the issue of coerced union
membership was based on the established doctrine of preemption.
This rule of law allows administrative agencies to adjudicate matters
over which both the agency and a court might have concurrent jurisdic-
tion. In this case the pre-emption doctrine applies because unfair labor
practices are violative of the National Labor Relations Act. Violations
of this act are within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. When such subject
matter is presented for adjudication, the federal courts must defer to
the NLRB in order to prevent conflicting regulation of conduct. 12
However, the court did take jurisdiction of the dues issue. Since
the payment of dues is specifically authorized by federal statute, that
requirement was not considered an arguably unfair labor practice, and
the court felt no need to defer to the NLRB. The court found that
the requirement that Buckley and Evans pay dues did not violate their
first amendment rights. While the court did not reach the question
whether state action was involved, it explicitly stated that "even if it
were. . . the dues requirement is not constitutionally infirm."'3 The
court explained that "where there is a proper governmental purpose
for imposing a restraint [on the press] and where the restraint is
imposed so as not to 'unwarrantedly abridge' acts normally compre-
hended within the first amendment, there is no abridgement of first
amendment rights.' 14
10. Id. at 313 n.6.
11. Id. at n.5.
12. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
13. 496F.2dat3lO.
14. Id. at 311.
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These mandatory dues were found to serve a substantial public
interest because the court found that Congress' purpose in authorizing
them was to minimize industrial strife and insure the unimpeded flow
of commerce by providing a viable collective bargaining apparatus. 15
The court pointed out that compulsory dues are necessary in order to
prevent "free riders" from undermining the union's ability to perform
this bargaining function. The court described "free riders" as "those
who enjoy the benefits of the union's negotiating efforts without assum-
ing a corresponding portion of the union's financial burden."'1  The
district court had held that Buckley and Evans received no substantial
benefits from their union membership and so were not "free riders"
and need not pay dues.17 The appellate court disagreed with the lower
court finding that membership in the union pension fund'" and enjoy-
ment of the benefits of union salary negotiating efforts' 9 were insuf.
ficient to constitute Buckley and Evans "free riders."
Thus, the court found a legitimate purpose in imposing such a
restraint. It further found that the means used, the imposition of union
dues, was reasonable and did not "unwarrantedly abridge" free speech.
The court said:
The dues here are not flat fees imposed directly on the exer-
cise of a federal right ... To the contrary, assuming ar-
guendo that government action is involved here, the dues
more logically would constitute the employee's share of the
expenses of operating a valid labor regulatory system which
serves a substantial public service."0
The court thus held that in states allowing union shops even con-
servative broadcast commentators must pay dues to the union con-
sidered the sole bargaining agent under the National Labor Relations
Act.
The question of coerced union membership and adherence to
union discipline, being an arguably unfair labor practice, was left to be
settled by the NLRB, but with enough hints as to the temper of the
court that a favorable NLRB decision would be surprising.
Robert D. Frank
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 354 F. Supp. at 848.
18. Plaintiffs indicated a willingness to renounce any claim they might have had
in the union pension fund, if they would no longer be required to pay union dues.
19. Both plaintiffs received wages above the union base scale.
20. 496F.2dat3ll.
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